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DUE PROCESS
heard. Only when the defendant raises a truly reasonable
suspicion as to the validity of the subsequent arrest must a more
formal inquiry take place. Whereas, if the defendant offers either
no excuse or no reasonable explanation for his subsequent arrest,
an evidentiary hearing into the matter is not required.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
Hope v. Perales453
(decided March 23, 1993)
Plaintiffs, who included "income-eligible women, physicians
and various health care organizations," 454 claimed that the New
York State Prenatal Care Assistance Program455 (hereinafter
PCAP) is violative of the New York State Constitution because it
does not include finaifcial assistance for "medically necessary
abortions" for similarly situated women eligible under PCAP
provisions.456 Plaintiffs, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief,457 contended that the "funding scheme" 45 8 violated their
453. 189 A.D.2d 287, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1st Dep't 1993) (per curiam).
454. Id. at 290, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
455. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw §§ 2520-29 (McKinney 1993). An "eligible
service recipient" is defined under § 2521 as:
[A] pregnant, low-income woman, who is not otherwise eligible for
medical assistance and whose income is one hundred eighty-five percent
or less of the comparable federal income official poverty line ....
Pregnant women eligible pursuant to this subdivision shall continue to be
eligible for assistance, without regard to any change in income of the
families of which they are members, through the end of the month in
which a sixty day period which begins on the last day their pregnancies
shall end.
Id.
456. Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 291, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
457. Id. at 290, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
458. Id. at 291, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 950. PCAP's funding scheme is set forth
in Chapter 584 and § 2522 of the New York Public Health Law, which
provides:
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constitutional rights to the free exercise of religion,4 59 due
process, 460 equal protection, 46 1 the aid, care and support of the
Comprehensive prenatal care services available under the prenatal care
assistance program include:
(a) prenatal risk assessment;
(b) prenatal care visits;
(c) laboratory services;
(d) health education for both parents regarding prenatal nutrition
and other aspects of prenatal care, alcohol and tobacco use,
substance abuse, use of medication, labor and delivery,
family planning to prevent future unintended pregnancies,
breast feeding, infant care and parenting;
(e) referral for pediatric care;
(f) referral for nutrition services including screening, education,
counseling, follow-up and provision of services under the
women, infants and children's program and the supplemental
nutrition assistance program;
(g) mental health and related social services including screening
and counseling;
(h) transportation services for prenatal care services;
(i) labor and delivery services;
(j) post-partum services including family planning services;
(k) inpatient care, specialty physician and clinic services which
are necessary to assure a healthy delivery and recovery;
(1) dental services;
(m) emergency room services;
(n) home care; and
(o) pharmaceuticals.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2522 (McKinney 1993).
459. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3. Section 3 provides in pertinent part:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this
state to all mankind; and no person shall be rendered incompetent to be
a witness on account of his opinions on matters of religious belief; but
the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to
excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace or safety of this state.
Id. The trial court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the PCAP program
interferes with women's free exercise of religion. Discussions concerning the
trial court's conclusion were not published. See Hope v. Perales, 150 Misc. 2d
985, 987, 571 N.Y.S.2d 971, 981 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1991)
[hereinafter Perales].
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needy, 462 and the protection and promotion of the state's
inhabitant's health, by interfering with affected women's
reproductive choice. 463 Under PCAP, pregnant women are
reimbursed according to the comprehensive list of prenatal and
postpartum care, however, no reimbursements are made for
terminating a pregnancy when it is medically advisable. 4 64
Affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court held that
the failure to provide funding for abortions is unconstitutional. 4 65
Further, the court stated that in order to uphold the
constitutionality of the statute, it must be expanded to include the
funding of therapeutic abortions. 4 66
The nineteen year old plaintiff, Jane Hope, "a carrier of sickle
cell anemia,... work[ed] forty-four hours [a] week and
attend[ed] college at night." 467  Because she had been
experiencing feelings of nausea and dizziness and had lost a
significant amount of weight, Hope went for a pregnancy test at a
clinic, the results of which "came back positive." 468 She was
"advised that an abortion would cost $900."469 After four weeks,
now twenty-one weeks pregnant, she returned to the clinic and
was advised that the cost of the abortion would now be between
460. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section 6 provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
461. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Section 11 provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof." Id.
462. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. Section 1 provides in pertinent part:
"The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be
provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and
by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine." Id.
463. Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 291, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
464. Id. at 290-91, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 950 ([P]ursuant to PCAP, "pregnant
women are entitled to receive financial assistance for a wide range of prenatal
and postpartum care whenever their family incomes are between 100 and
185% of the poverty level.").
465. Id. at 297-98, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
466. Id. at 297, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
467. Perales, 150 Misc. 2d at 994, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
468. Id.
469. Id.
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$1,000 and $1,500.470 Aside from the increased cost, the
physician informed her that "under the Medicaid standard, an
abortion was medically necessary in her circumstance."47 1
Despite the fact that Hope could not afford to maintain medical
insurance, she was not eligible for Medicaid and thus could not
afford the abortion. 472
The first department agreed with the trial court's ruling, which
declared that "chapter 584 of the Laws of 1989 violate[d] ... the
New York State Constitution, insofar as it denies funding for
medically necessary abortions for otherwise eligible
women .... "473 The court proceeded to "enjoin[] defendants
from denying such funding and ordered ... that the subject
[PCAP] be expanded to include funds for medically necessary
abortions . -474 Defendants, the Commissioners of the New
York State Department of Health and the Department of Social
Services, argued that the legislation does not interfere or "impair
the ability of women ... to procure abortions." 475 In asserting
their argument, defendants relied on the expressed legislative
purpose of the PCAP program to expand government-funded
prenatal care "in order to remedy a special significant problem,
the detrimental effect on the health of infants caused by the lack
of prenatal care . . "476 The defendants also argued that such
legislative intent "in no way damages, discriminates against, or
even meaningfully relates to a woman's right to an abortion, and,
therefore, PCAP is constitutional in all respects." 477 However,
the appellate division failed to find the defendants' arguments of
"legitimate and limited legislative purpose" persuasive. 47 8
Despite the contentions proffered by the defendants, the court
looked to the practical effect of limiting the entitlements under
470. Id.
471. Id. at 994, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 979 (emphasis added).
472. Id. at 994-95, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
473. Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 292, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 291, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 292-93, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
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PCAP to specified types of prenatal services. 479 Noting that
PCAP will provide funding solely for prenatal and postpartum
care, the court recognized such a policy would have the effect of
pressuring woman to give birth, 480 which in turn would act as a
limitation upon the reproductive freedom of similarly situated
women whose family incomes range from 100 to 185 percent of
the poverty level. 4 81
Addressing the due process claim, the court concluded that in
forcing women to postpone a procedure, increase the medical risk
to themselves, incur greater costs, or forego the procedure
altogether would work a "constitutionally impermissible
result." 482 Recognizing that PCAP does not directly interfere
with a woman's right to an abortion, the appellate division
emphasized the fact that the options for poor woman are more
"circumscribed." 483 The appellate division, citing to the trial
court, noted that:
[T]he dichotomy of care created by PCAP is not designed to
ensure that an eligible woman receives that medical assistance
best suited for her for it ignores the risks to her health and the
likelihood of grave fetal defects if she is left with no alternative
but to bear the child when medically unwarranted. 484
Moreover, the appellate division agreed with the trial court's
reasoning which analyzed the provisions of PCAP under the
aforementioned state constitutional sections and affirmed the
ruling of the lower court which held Chapter 584 unconstitutional
479. Id.
480. Id. at 293-94, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 951. The trial court agreed with the
plaintiffs' argument that PCAP impermissibly steers women toward childbirth
even where a therapeutic abortion could be life saving, the trial court remarked
that "PCAP becomes an affirmative act by the State blocking a woman without
means from obtaining an abortion, possibly creating a serious risk to the
woman's life and/or health." Perales, 150 Misc. 2d at 993, 571 N.Y.S.2d at
977.
481. Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 294, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
482. Id. at 293, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
483. Id. at 293, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
484. Id. at 291, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 950 (citing Perales, 150 Misc. 2d at 990,
571 N.Y.S.2d at 976).
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for failing to provide for "medically necessary abortions." '4 85
Specifically, the court held that PCAP did not conform to the
Due Process Clause 486 because it "encompasse[d] the right to
reproductive choice which is an integral part of the right to
privacy and bodily autonomy." 487 The appellate division
reasoned that the only logical explanation for the legislature's
discriminatory funding scheme in PCAP was that "a
majority ... was endeavoring to avoid the political pitfalls
accompanying anything even remotely connected to the subject of
abortion." 4 88 The court further remarked that "so long as
abortion remains legal in New York State, the Legislature has no
power to abolish women's constitutional rights no matter what
the personal views of the individual members of that institution
might be toward abortions. '489
Relying on the New York Court of Appeal's decision in
Golden v. Clark,490 the court turned its discussion to equal
protection principles. The appellate division focused on whether
Chapter 584, by excluding funding for medically warranted
abortions, established a "'classification which burdens
[fundamental] rights.' 4 9 1 Furthermore, the court noted that
"'[i]f it does, it must withstand strict scrutiny and is void unless
[the court finds it is] necessary to promote a compelling [s]tate
interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose.'492
Applying this test, the appellate division rejected "[tihe state's
interest in advancing the cause of healthy mothers bearing healthy
485. Id. at 298, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 954. This case, Hope v. Perales, had been
appealed by the defendants and was argued before the New York Court of
Appeals on March 17, 1994, where a decision is pending. See James Dao,
Lawyer Takes Abortion - Rights Case to Top Albany Court, N.Y. L.J., Mar.
18, 1994, at B5.
486. N.Y. CONST. art. I § 6.
487. Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 297, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. 76 N.Y.2d 618, 564 N.E.2d 611, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1990).
491. Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 295, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 952 (quoting Golden v.
Clark, 76 N.Y.2d 618, 623, 564 N.E.2d 611, 613, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3).
492. Id. at 295, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 952 (quoting Golden, 76 N.Y.2d at 623,
564 N.E.2d at 613, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 3).
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babies [as having] no reasonable relationship to the statutory
abortion exclusion. " 493 The appellate division criticized the
defendants' position that "no one is illegally prohibited from
procuring an abortion" as being "extremely facile." 494 By
recognizing that pregnant women whose income falls between
100 and 185 percent of the federal poverty level as being
"'needy' and requir[ing] help in obtaining pregnancy-related
health services, the legislature violated section 1, article XVII, as
well as section 3, article XVII,... by conditioning aid to this
needy class on a standard totally unconnected to need or health;
that is, whether an otherwise eligible woman undergoes an
abortion or gives birth."495 The court explained that upon
assuming a duty or "responsibility" of helping an identified class,
such as, pregnant women eligible under PCAP, "it was required
to do so in a neutral nondiscriminatory manner that does not
coerce poor women into choosing childbirth even at the expense
of their health and well-being."496 Although indigency or
pregnancy does not in itself place a woman in a suspect class, the
493. Id. at 295, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 952-53.
494. Id. at 295, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 953. In discussing the effect of PCAP's
exclusion of funding for "therapeutic abortions," the court found it to
"support[ ] childbirth, sometimes at the expense of the mother's health
*.. [which thus] clearly renders chapter 584 in conflict with the requirement
that government actions must be constitutionally neutral in affecting the
exercise of fundamental rights." Id. at 296, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 953. The court
stated:
'[O]nce the Legislature identifies a group as needy, it may not exclude
individuals from the benefits extended to that group by imposing criteria
having nothing to do with need. Thus, the [s]tate constitutional
obligation of article XVII § 1 to aid, care and support the needy is a
'fundamental part of the social contract' which 'is not a matter of
legislative grace; rather, it is specifically mandated by our Constitution.'
Id. (quoting Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451, 400
N.Y.S.2d 728, 730 (1977)).
495. Id. at 296, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 953. See, e.g., Klein v. Broderick, 145
A.D.2d 145, 538 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1989).
496. Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 297, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 954. See also Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 334 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[D]iscriminatory
distribution of the benefits of government largesse can discourage the exercise
of fundamental liberties just as effectively as can an outright denial of those
rights through criminal and regulatory sanctions.")
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court recognized that the circumstances under PCAP effectively
jeopardize the woman's constitutional right to choose. 497
Finally, the appellate division found the trial court had properly
chosen the appropriate remedy when it decided to expand the
scope of the program to "include funding for medically indicated
abortions rather than voiding the law in its entirety . "498 The
appellate division did not consider whether such claims were
viable under the Federal Constitution because, as mentioned in
dicta, "federal constitutional law appears to be insufficient to
afford relief, and the United States Supreme Court has already
upheld the sort of restrictions involved [therein]." 499 The court
proceeded to delineate support for allowing consideration of the
issue based on the additional protections set forth in the New
York State Constitution.500
Clearly this case illustrates the important components of our
system of federalism by enforcing rights and protections not
provided for under Federal law and allowing states, through their
own legislature and judiciary, to create additional constitutional
rights for individuals.
497. Id. at 297, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 294, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
500. Id. The court recognized the historical practices of expanding upon
constitutional protections through interpretation of a states constitution where
such protections had not been incorporated into the federal constitutional rights
or protections. Id. (quoting People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 302,
501 N.E.2d 556, 559-60, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 911 (1986)). The court further
stated:
[U]nder established principles of federalism ... the States also have
sovereign powers. When their courts interpret State statutes or the State
Constitution the decisions of these courts are conclusive if not violative
of Federal law. Although State courts may not circumscribe rights
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, they may interpret their own
law to supplement or expand them.
Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 294, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 952 (citations omitted).
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